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Band-Aid Solutions: New York’s
Piecemeal Attempt to Address
Legal Issues Created by DOMA in
Conjunction with Advances in
Surrogacy
James Healy*
I. Introduction
In California, in July of 2009, Cat Cora, a renowned
celebrity chef, gave birth to a son as a result of an implanted
embryo.1 The embryo was the product of an in vitro fertilized
egg and sperm. Both the egg and the sperm were donated.2 Due
to the advances of assisted reproductive technology (ART), this
type of pregnancy and birth is not at all uncommon; through
2006, nearly five hundred thousand babies have been born using
such ART.3 Ms. Cora‟s situation, however, was a little more
complex because the egg donor was her domestic partner,
Jennifer Cora. The two women had been together for over ten
years, and Jennifer had already given birth to three other
children, also through in vitro fertilization. Indeed, Jennifer had
given birth to her third child only a few months earlier and the
embryo was one of two fertilized eggs, one having been donated
* B.A. Columbia College, Columbia University (2008); J.D. Candidate
Pace University School of Law (2012). The Author wishes to thank his wife
and children for their patience and support as well as Professors Dorfman and
Doernberg who challenged him to write and think outside his comfort zone.
1. Desiree Fawn, Cat Cora Welcomes Baby Boy Nash!, CELEBRITY
BABYSCOOP (July 23, 2009), http://www.celebritybabyscoop.com/2009/07/23/
cat-cora-welcomes-baby-boy-nash.
2. Iron Chef Cat Cora and Her Lesbian Partner Both Pregnant, FOX NEWS
(Mar. 10, 2009), http://www.foxnews.com/entertainment/2009/03/10/ iron-chefcat-cora-lesbian-partner-pregnant/.
3. Frequently Asked Questions About Infertility, AM. SOC‟Y FOR REPROD.
MED., http://www.asrm.org/awards/index.aspx?id=3012 (last visited Jan. 11,
2010).
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by Cat. Although the couple will not DNA-test to determine
which embryo produced the child, all four children are the
genetic offspring of the same sperm donor.4
If the happy family chooses to remain in California, their
legal family status will be impacted by several laws and judicial
holdings. Currently, the status of same-sex marriage in
California is indeterminate,5 but the law does provide that
registered domestic partners shall have the same rights as
married spouses, including with respect to a child of the
partnership.6 The California Supreme Court acknowledged that
legal motherhood can be a factor of either genetics or giving
4. Iron Chef Cat Cora and Wife Both Pregnant, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 9,
2009),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/03/09/iron-chef-cat-cora-andwi_n_173283.html.
5. Same-sex marriage has undergone a turbulent history in California. In
2004, the mayor of San Francisco began offering marriage licenses to same-sex
couples despite the 2000 law, which limited marriage to one man and one
woman. CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2004). The Supreme Court of California
ordered the city to stop issuing the marriage licenses. Clay Rehig, California
Bans Gay Marriage by Simple Majority Vote, 14 PUB. INT. L. REP. 152, 152
(2009). In May of 2008, the Supreme Court of California struck down the law
as unconstitutional and effectively granted same-sex couples the right to
marry. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008). For the next five
months 18,000 same-sex couples were married in California. In November of
that year Proposition 8, a constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex
couples from marrying, passed by a popular vote, once again banning same-sex
marriage. See Rehig, supra at 153. In June of 2009, the California Supreme
Court held that Proposition 8 did not violate the California Constitution, and,
therefore, same-sex couples could not legally marry in the state. Strauss v.
Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 60 (Cal. 2009). Proposition 8 was then challenged in
Federal Court, and in August of 2010, Judge Vaughn R. Walker held that
Proposition 8 violated both the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1003 (N.D. Cal.
2010). The Ninth Circuit then granted a stay of Judge Walker‟s order pending
an expedited appeal. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 10-16696, 2010 WL
3212786, at *1 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010). This issue has become even more
complicated in that the California Governors (Schwarzenegger and Brown)
have chosen not to appeal the decision. See Carol J. Williams, Judges Ask for
Court’s Help on Prop. 8: Panel Seeks Input on the Right of Private Groups to
Defend the Ban on Gay Marriage, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2011, at AA1. The case
was then appealed by the political groups that placed the initiative on the
ballot. It is unclear, however, if those groups will be determined to have
standing in the case. Id. Although it seems inevitable that the Supreme Court
will address, and ultimately resolve, the same-sex marriage issue, the
procedural snag in this instance may delay that decision longer than expected.
6. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(d) (West 2010).
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birth,7 and further addressed, in 2005, the specific situation in
which one lesbian domestic partner donates an egg for the other
to carry with the intention that the baby will be the child of
both.8 Ultimately, the court in K.M. v. E.G. held that a child
could legally have two parents who are both women.9 The
critical factor the court considered was the intention of the two
women to act as parents together.10
California has adopted the Uniform Parentage Act (UPA),
which, among other things, determines the legal father of a
child conceived through ART. The model statute provided that,
when a married woman used donated sperm to give birth, her
husband, assuming he had consented to the procedure, is the
legal father.11 The sperm donor is presumed to have lost his
7. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). A married couple entered
into a contract with another woman to carry the embryo of the husband and
wife and relinquish the baby after birth. The surrogate mother and the genetic
mother both filed suits, prior to birth, to be declared “the mother.” Id. at 778.
The court acknowledged that, although both women presented acceptable
proof of maternity, under (then current) California law the child could only
have one mother. Id. at 781-82. It ultimately found in favor of the genetic—
rather than the surrogate—basing its decision on the original intent of the
parties. Id. at 787.
8. K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005).
9. Id. at 681.
10. Id. In this case the court had to deal with the intersection of the
Uniform Parentage Act, adopted into the California Family Code, designed to
protect and define the non-parental relationship of an anonymous sperm donor
in an ART assisted pregnancy, which states:
If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and surgeon
and with the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated
artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband,
the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father
of a child thereby conceived. The husband‟s consent must be
in writing and signed by him and his wife.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(a) (West 2010). For a situation where, in the same
clinical setting, a woman donates an egg in an ART assisted pregnancy with
intention that she will be a co-parent to the child, see K.M., 177 P.3d at 681.
11. UNIF.
PARENTAGE
ACT
(amended
2002),
available
at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/1990s/upa7390.htm (“The
donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial
insemination of a married woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law
as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.” (emphasis
added)).
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claim to parentage.12 In adopting the UPA, the California
Legislature made an important modification to the model
statute. The legislature removed the word “married” to allow
single women to obtain donated sperm without the donor
incurring parentage and the resultant responsibility and
liability.13
Furthermore, California allows second parent adoption, the
process permitting a same-sex partner to establish a legal
parent-child relationship with a non-birth, non-genetic, child
through an adoption that does not terminate the legal status of
the original parent.14
So if Cat, Jennifer, and the four children remain in
California, their domestic harmony should not be much in
doubt. Under statutory law,15 and the decision in K.M. v. E.G.,16
their status as parents should not be questioned. The sperm
donor will not be able to assert any parental rights,17 and, to be
100 percent certain, they could perform a second parent
adoption—although who would be adopting whom is a question
to be answered later in the discussion. What if, however, the
family chose to re-locate? What if, hypothetically, they began to
move around the country looking for a new state to put down
roots?
This Article will highlight the legal cross-purposes created
by the inconsistent laws and policies of the several states with
respect to same-sex marriage, adoption, and custody, and then
will focus in more detail on how this inconsistency is manifest in
New York State specifically. It will point out how the increasing
use of ART, in particular gestational surrogacy, creates an
increasing tension between inconsistent legislative, executive
and judicial actions. In the end, it is likely that the legal
12. Id.
13. “The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician and surgeon or
to a licensed sperm bank for use in artificial insemination or in vitro
fertilization of a woman other than the donor‟s wife is treated in law as if he
were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.” CAL. FAM. CODE §
7613(b) (emphasis added).
14. Sharon S. v. Superior Ct., 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003).
15. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(d).
16. 117 P.3d 673, 681 (Cal. 2005).
17. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b).
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quandaries created can only be resolved by a constitutional
declaration.
II. Overview of the National Conflict of Same-Sex Marriage,
Adoption and Custody
If Jennifer and Cat‟s first stop was Oklahoma, they may be
surprised to find that not only does that state restrict marriage
to a man and a woman,18 but it also does not recognize any
same-sex partnership.19 Although in California the Coras,
through their domestic partnership, would be given the same
rights as married couples, particularly regarding their children,
in Oklahoma they would be considered legal strangers in all
aspects.
As of late 2010, states have taken a number of different
approaches to same-sex marriage. Five states and the District of
Columbia allow same-sex couples to legally marry,20 eight states
allow for some form of domestic partnership or civil union, and
the rest have laws or constitutional provisions restricting
marriage to heterosexual couples.21 States‟ different approaches
to marriage regulation are not, by themselves, unusual. What
makes them problematic, however, is how the federal
government and, by legal extension the states, have chosen to
contend with these differences.
The Constitution states that, “Full Faith and Credit shall
be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial

18. See OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 35(A) (2010) (“Marriage in this state shall
consist only of the union of one man and one woman.”).
19. See 43 OKLA. ST. ANN. § 3.1 (West 2010) (“A marriage between persons
of the same gender performed in another state shall not be recognized as valid
and binding in this state as of the date of the marriage.”).
20. As of the writing of this article, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire and Vermont allow same-sex marriage. See NAT‟L CONF. OF
ST.
LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/HumanServices/
SameSexMarriage/tabid/16430/Default.aspx (last updated Sept. 2010). The
status of same-sex marriage in California is still uncertain. See supra text
accompanying note 5.
21. California, Hawaii, Maine, Nevada, New Jersey, Oregon, Washington
and Wisconsin all allow for some legal recognition of same-sex relationships.
The law is, however, particularly mutable in this area. Id.
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Proceedings of every other State.”22 Traditionally, with respect
to marriage, this constitutional clause required each state to
recognize a marriage legally entered into in another state.23 In
1996, however, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), which barred the federal government from recognizing
same-sex marriage and permitting states to do so as well.24
Given this permission, thirty-nine states adopted some
statutory version of the DOMA.25 As a consequence, some states
recognize same-sex marriages from other states,26 some states
grant some recognition to domestic partnerships or civil unions
from other states,27 and others, like Oklahoma, will not legally
recognize any same-sex relationship from any state.28
Since Oklahoma‟s law would seriously call into question the
legal nature of the Coras‟ relationship and the certainty with
which they both could be legal parents to their children, it is
likely that they would try to find their new home in another
state. If, instead, they went to Michigan, they would find a
prohibition against joint adoption by same-sex couples.29 State
law for same-sex adoption is even less consistent than for samesex marriage. Fifteen states and the District of Columbia allow
same-sex couples to adopt jointly.30 Five states prohibit same-

22. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
23. The Supreme Court clearly defined marriage with respect to the full
faith and credit clause in Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 223 (1934)
(“Marriages not polygamous or incestuous, or otherwise declared void by
statute, will, if valid by the law of the state where entered into, be recognized
as valid in every other jurisdiction.”).
24. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
25. See NAT‟L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 20.
26. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 308(a)-(c) (West 2010).
27. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-34 (West 2010).
28. See 43 OKLA. ST. ANN. § 3.1 (West 2010).
29. It is both telling and ironic that, although it is widely understood that
Michigan does not allow same-sex couples to jointly adopt, there is no statute
or appellate court decision explicitly stating this. The basis for the prohibition
is a 2004 statement by the attorney general of the state and the overall
conservative nature of the Michigan courts. See Amanda Ruggeri, Emerging
Gay Adoption Fight Shares Battle Lines of Same-Sex Marriage Debate, U.S.
NEWS
&
WORLD
REP.,
Oct.
31,
2008,
available
at
http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/national/2008/10/31/emerging-gayadoption-fight-shares-battle-lines-of-same-sex-marriage-debate.html.
30. As with same-sex marriage, the law on adoption is often in flux. As of
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sex couples from jointly adopting,31 either through specific
language in a statute,32 court decisions interpreting somewhat
ambiguous adoption law,33 or a prohibition against any
unmarried couples adopting. Since these states do not sanction
same-sex marriage, they effectively deny those couples the
ability to jointly adopt.34 Most other states are unclear about
whether, as a matter of law, same-sex couples can jointly adopt.
The statutes are ambiguous in that they do not explicitly
prohibit the practice and often the courts have not ruled
definitively.35
If a state does not specifically allow same-sex couples to
adopt, and the state does not allow for same-sex marriage, then
the right of joint custody or visitation would depend on the local
court‟s determination. As recently as 2007, appellate courts in
only twenty states addressed the issue of whether same-sex,
non-genetic, partners have some form of parental custody or
visitations rights.36 Those courts used a wide range of standards
the beginning of 2010, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia,
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Oregon,
Vermont, Washington and Wisconsin are the states that allow joint adoption
by
same-sex
couples.
See
HUM.
RTS.
CAMPAIGN,
http://www.hrc.org/issues/parenting/adoptions/adoption_laws.asp (last visited
Jan. 9, 2011). Yet, in Florida, a state traditionally showing antipathy toward
same-sex couples, a state court of appeal held that the ban on same-sex
adoption was a violation of the Florida Constitution. See Fla. Dep‟t of Children
& Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79, 92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010).
Further, the governor and attorney general chose not to appeal the decision,
thus ending a thirty-three year ban on same-sex adoption. See Mary Ellen
Klas, Gay Adoption Fight Over, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 23, 2010, at 1B.
31. States hostile to same-sex couples adopting are Arkansas, Michigan,
Mississippi, Ohio, and Utah. See HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, supra note 30.
32. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (West 2009) (“Adoption by
couples of the same gender is prohibited.”).
33. HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, supra note 30.
34. Note how the two laws in North Carolina work to deny same-sex joint
adoption. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-2-301(c) (West 2009) (“If the individual
who files the petition is unmarried, no other individual may join in the
petition . . . .”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-1 (“A valid and sufficient marriage is
created by the consent of a male and female person who may lawfully marry,
presently to take each other as husband and wife, freely . . . .”).
35. See, e.g., Katherine M. Swift, Parenting Agreements, the Potential
Power of Contract, and the Limits of Family Law, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 913,
950-52 (2007).
36. See Deborah H. Wald, The Parentage Puzzle: The Interplay Between
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to determine those partners‟ rights.37 This situation is further
complicated by sometimes conflicting federal laws.
By the mid 1980s, every state had adopted the Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA).38 This statute
intended to, among other things, provide for the equivalent of
full faith and credit to out-of-state child custody orders.39
Significantly, the Act also states that one state cannot make a
custody determination if there is a pending custody issue in the
court of another state.40 This, however, can be in opposition to
DOMA, which allows states to refuse to recognize same-sex
marriage or legal relationships. An example of this
incompatibility was litigated over the span of five years and
across two states in the case of Miller v. Jenkins.41 A lesbian
couple from Virginia, which does not offer or recognize same-sex
marriage or civil union, traveled to Vermont to enter into a civil
union.42 After having an ART-assisted child, the couple

Genetics, Procreative Intent, and Parental Conduct in Determining Legal
Parentage, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL‟Y & L. 379, 393 (2007).
37. For example, Wisconsin uses a four prong test to measure whether a
non-biological mother should be granted custody. In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.,
533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995) (examining whether 1) biological parent
consented to and/or fostered relationship, 2) petitioning parent lived in same
house, 3) petitioner took responsibility for child‟s care, education and
development, and 4) there was a sufficient length of time to create a bond). In
New Jersey, the court used the Wisconsin test to determine if the woman
seeking custody has acted as a “psychological parent.” V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d
539, 555 (N.J. 2000). On the other end of the spectrum, however, is Ohio
where a court has ruled that parentage (and the right to custody) should be
determined by strict genetics. Belisto v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 767 (Ohio Ct.
C.P. 1994). It should be noted that, in the time since this decision, the court
has acknowledged that this approach may be out of step with use of ART by
same-sex partners. See generally Nemcek v. Paskey, 849 N.E.2d 108 (Ohio Ct.
C.P. 2006).
38. Courtney G. Joslin, Interstate Recognition of Parentage in a Time of
Disharmony: Same-Sex Parent Families and Beyond, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 563, 576
(2009).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, No. 2007-271, 2008 WL
2811218 (Vt. Mar. 14, 2008); Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d 822
(Va. 2008). For a complete history of this case, see Joslin, supra note 38, at
564, 583-86.
42. See Joslin, supra note 38, at 564.
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established permanent residence in Vermont.43 Subsequently,
when their relationship ended, the Vermont court made a
temporary custody determination. One of the women decided
that she did not want the other to have any contact with the
child and so moved back to Virginia and filed an action
requesting full custody and sole legal parenthood.44 The Virginia
lower court determined that it was not bound to recognize the
Vermont determination, which was based on the civil union
entered into in Vermont, because Virginia‟s DOMA rendered
that union null and void. Simply, the court determined that
DOMA, allowing no faith and credit, trumped UCCJA, which
called for full faith and credit.45 The conflict occupied the courts
of Vermont and Virginia from 2003 to 2008. Ultimately, the
supreme courts of both states held that the original Vermont
custody order was valid,46 although it took almost one-third of
the baby‟s childhood to get this binding, final determination.
As Michigan might not seem too friendly to the Coras‟ ART
family, they may decide that the best course of action is to
perform a second parent adoption, which they may have found
unnecessary in California. For that purpose, they may travel
south into Ohio. Unfortunately for the Coras, however, they
would find that an Ohio court has held that second parent
adoption is not allowed without the termination of the rights of
the biological parent.47
Second parent adoption restriction seems to correspond
roughly in states that appear to have open antipathy to samesex relationships. Three states have laws banning lesbian or gay
43. Id. at 583.
44. Id. at 584.
45. In point of fact, the Virginia court, alluded to in the appellate court
ruling, referred to the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (“PKPA”) rather
than the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (“UCCJA”). See MillerJenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 637 S.E.2d 330, 332 (Va. Ct. App. 2006). The PKPA
has a similar full faith and credit recognition intention as the UCCJA on
interstate custody and visitation orders. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2006).
46. Miller-Jenkins, 2008 WL 2811218, at *1; Miller-Jenkins, 661 S.E.2d
at 822.
47. In re Adoption of Jane Doe, 719 N.E.2d 1071, 1073 (Ohio Ct. App.
1998) (“Based upon the clear meaning of R.C. 3107.15(A), we find that the trial
court did not err in finding that the biological mother's parental rights would
terminate upon adoption of the child by appellant, a non-stepparent.”).

9

700

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:2

individuals outright from adopting the children of their
partners, and the courts of three other states have determined
that second parent adoption is not permissible.48 Six of the
seven states also ban same-sex marriage or partnerships and do
not permit same-sex couples to adopt children jointly.49
Conversely, thirteen states allow second parent adoption either
by statute or by a ruling of an appellate court.50 The majority of
states, however, have neither explicitly prohibited the practice,
nor do they have any court decisions ruling one way or another
regarding the practice. 51
Flustered, frustrated, and perhaps missing the warm
weather of California, the family might travel to Florida,
looking to establish legal rights and residence. Their stay in
Florida, though, would be brief. While California afforded them
the right to enter into a domestic partnership, which would
confer all the same rights as married couples enjoy, Florida bars
same-sex couples, by statute and constitutional provision, not
only from marrying but also from entering into civil unions or
legal domestic partnerships.52 Furthermore, Florida refuses to
48. Arkansas, Mississippi, and Utah have statutes prohibiting gays or
lesbians from second parent adoptions. Nebraska, Ohio and Wisconsin have
had second parent adoption restricted by appellate court decision. Joslin,
supra note 38, at 578-79.
49. Id. (Arkansas, Mississippi, Utah, Ohio, and Wisconsin are consistent
with their lack of same-sex recognition for marriage, joint adoption and second
parent adoption). Nebraska most probably should be included in this group,
but in In re Adoption of Luke, 640 N.W.2d 374 (Neb. 2002), the court, in ruling
against second parent adoption, also stated:
[t]he county court also stated that Nebraska's adoption
statutes do not provide for „two non-married persons to
adopt a minor child, no matter how qualified they are.‟
Because A.E. alone sought to adopt Luke, the issue of
whether two nonmarried persons are entitled to adopt was
not presented to the county court in this case. Thus, that
issue is not before this court on appeal, and we do not
consider it.
Id. at 378.
50. Joslin, supra note 38, at 578 n.70.
51. See HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, supra note 30.
52. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.04(1) (West 2010) (“No county court judge or
clerk of the circuit court in this state shall issue a license for the marriage . . .
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recognize, under its DOMA, any same-sex marriage or domestic
partnership from another state.53 Unlike California, it is not
clear whether or not second parent adoption is permitted.54
In 2006, a Florida appellate court ruled on a case involving
a same-sex couple that had two children through ART.55 Despite
a fifteen-year relationship and the fact that the couple entered
together into a sperm donation and subsequent co-parenting
agreements,56 the only meaningful factor in determining
custody, visitation, or child support rights was biology.57 The
non-biological partner, acting as parent to the children, was
considered a legal stranger.58 Perhaps shaken by the tenor of
the law in Florida, the Coras might choose to make a final
attempt at stability and clarity in their family relationships.
They might travel to New York and hope for a clearer and more
logical legal determination of how they relate to one another.
III. The Situation in New York
A. Marriage
In New York State, the Domestic Relations Law (DRL) does
not specifically refer to same-sex marriage as does, for example,
the law in Tennessee,59 which forbids it, or in Vermont, which
specifically amended its law to allow it.60 In 2006, the New York
unless one party is a male and the other party is a female.”).
53. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (“Marriages between persons of the same
sex entered into in any jurisdiction . . . are not recognized for any purpose in
this state.”).
54. The decision by the district court of appeal in Florida striking down
the state‟s statutory ban on homosexual adoption, see supra note 30 and
accompanying text, did not address whether or not second parent adoption,
regardless of sexual orientation, would be permitted.
55. See Wakeman v. Dixon, 921 So. 2d 669 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
56. Id. at 670.
57. Id. at 673.
58. Id. at 672-73.
59. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113(a) (West 2010) (“[T]he relationship of one
(1) man and one (1) woman shall be the only legally recognized marital
contract in this state in order to provide the unique and exclusive rights and
privileges to marriage.”).
60. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 8 (2010) (substituted “two people” for “one
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Court of Appeals determined that, although the DRL does not
explicitly define marriage as between a man and a woman, the
intent of the 1909 legislature to limit marriage to members of
the opposite sex was implicit in its use of the terms “husband”
and “wife” in descriptive and regulatory sections.61 The court
viewed the law as specifically prohibiting same-sex marriage in
New York.62 The legal issue in this case, then, became whether
or not the court would determine that the law, as defined, was
unconstitutional.63 Same-sex marriage can be legitimized or
banned through legislation, court action,64 or both, with
different results, as is the case in California. In California, there
has been a strange dance between the legislature, the courts,
and the electorate.65 Ruling on the legislative prohibition
against same-sex marriage, the California Supreme Court found
the statute to be unconstitutional.66 This decision was then
invalidated by the passage of Proposition 8, a constitutional
amendment, which defined marriage as between a man and a
woman.67
The New York Court of Appeals, unlike the California
Supreme Court, analyzed the New York statute‟s constitutional
issue under a rational basis test, the lowest level of
constitutional scrutiny, and found that it was rational for the
legislature to deny same-sex couples the rights and benefits of
marriage.68 In deferring to the intent of the 1909 legislature, the

man and one woman”).
61. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 6 (N.Y. 2006).
62. Id. (“New York‟s statutory law clearly limits marriage to opposite-sex
couples.”).
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009) (finding IOWA
CODE § 595.2, which defined marriage as only between a man and a woman,
unconstitutional).
65. Rehig, supra note 5, at 152-55.
66. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal. 2008).
67. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5.
68. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 6-17. It is worth noting that, although the
constitutional amendment overturned the decision in In re Marriage Cases
regarding same-sex marriage, the law as it stands now in California based on
that decision is that the issue of same-sex marriage requires strict scrutiny.
This is in stark contrast to the New York court‟s decisions to treat the issue
under rational basis.
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court did make clear that it was up to the legislature to make
any change that would recognize same-sex marriage.69 As
recently as December 2009, the New York legislature has voted
specifically not to do so.70
Despite the Court of Appeals‟ ruling that same-sex couples
do not have the right to be married in New York, other lower
courts have addressed the issue of recognizing the same-sex
marriages of couples married legally in other jurisdictions. For
example, the Appellate Division, Fourth Department ruled that
a lesbian couple‟s marriage legally entered into in Canada
should be recognized in New York for the purpose of obtaining
spousal health benefits.71 Other departments have not held
similarly, distinguishing between marriages and legal civil
unions.72 In Martinez, the court stated that:
For well over a century, New York has recognized
marriages solemnized outside of New York unless
they fall into two categories of exception: (1)
marriage, the recognition of which is prohibited
by the “positive law” of New York and (2)
marriages involving incest or polygamy, both of
which fall within the prohibitions of “natural
law.”73
In an interesting analysis and application of the Hernandez
decision, the court reasoned that if the Court of Appeals stated
that the legislature could pass a (positive) law permitting samesex marriage, then that law, by definition, would not be in
opposition with public policy.74
Shortly thereafter, in 2008, then-Governor David Paterson

69. Id. at 1-5.
70. Jeremy W. Peters, New York Senate Turns Back Bill on Gay
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2009, at A1.
71. Martinez v. Cnty. of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740 (App. Div. 2008).
72. See, e.g., Langan v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 849 N.Y.S.2d 105 (App.
Div. 3d Dep‟t 2007) (declining to recognize a civil union from Vermont for the
purpose of granting death benefits).
73. Martinez, 850 N.Y.S.2d at 742.
74. Id. at 192.
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issued an executive order directing state agencies to recognize
same-sex marriages performed in other states or foreign
countries.75 This directive has been upheld, at least at the trial
level,76 and continues to be the policy for state agencies.
Currently in New York, therefore, same-sex couples may not
marry legally in the state, but the law compels recognition of
same-sex marriages entered into in other states or countries.
The implications and contradictions of this duality extend
beyond the obvious areas of health and death benefits, to the
more complex and constantly evolving areas of adoption and
child custody.
B.

Adoption

In New York, the DRL states that “[a]n adult unmarried
person, an adult married couple together, or any two unmarried
adult intimate partners together may adopt another person.”77
Again, although it might be inferred, the language does not
specifically refer to same-sex couples as adoption laws in some
other states do.78 In 1995, the Court of Appeals addressed the
issue of adoptions by unmarried couples (both heterosexual and
homosexual).79 Specifically, the court held that same-sex
partners could legally adopt a child together in New York (if
that is found to be in the interest of the child).80

75. Arlene G. Dubin & Sheila Agnew, As the Same-Sex Landscape Evolves
Prepare to Serve This New Group of Clients, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 10, 2009.
76. Golden v. Paterson, 877 N.Y.S.2d 822, 837 (Sup. Ct. 2008). Taxpayers
challenged the executive order on the basis of state expending funds for
benefits or entitlements for spouses previously not eligible. Here the court‟s
application of the rational basis test worked against those challenging the
order. In any event the court, albeit a supreme court, upheld the validity of the
order.
77. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110 (McKinney 2010). The statute was
amended in 2010 to include unmarried couples. Prior to the amendment the
statute read: “an adult unmarried person or an adult husband and his adult
wife together may adopt another person.”
78. See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3(5) (West 2007) (“Adoption by
couples of the same gender is prohibited.”).
79. In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995).
80. Id. at 405 (“New York has not adopted a policy disfavoring adoption
by either single persons or homosexuals. In fact, the most recent legislative
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While this decision put gay and lesbian couples on
comparable footing with their heterosexual counterparts with
respect to adopting a child who is a biological stranger to both
parents, it did not address the fundamental difference between
a child born to a married couple and a child born to a committed
lesbian couple. When a child is born into a marriage, it is
presumed that the husband of the mother is the child‟s father,81
even when the husband may not be the “genetic” father.
Conversely, if one member of a lesbian couple gives birth to a
child in New York, which does not allow for same-sex marriage,
the partner of the mother has no legal right or connection to the
child, even if there has been an ongoing relationship with the
intention, and some history, of raising the child together.82
Second parent adoption became the method by which samesex couples could establish legal parentage in such situations.
The Court of Appeals ruled on this issue in In re Jacob.83 The
court held that, although the DRL specifies that, when an
adoption takes place the biological parent is relieved of all
parental duties,84 a termination of parental rights is not
required when a child is being adopted but remains in the
family unit.85 It applied the same legislative exception that
allows for step-parent adoption without the termination of the

document relating to the subject urges courts to construe section 117 in
precisely the manner we have as it cautions against discrimination against
„nonmarital children‟ and „unwed parents.‟ An interpretation of the statute
that avoids such discrimination or hardship is all the more appropriate here
where a contrary ruling could jeopardize the legal status of the many New
York children whose adoptions by second parents have already taken place.”
(citations omitted)).
81. Wald, supra note 36, at 400.
82. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991). For a thorough
examination of this case, see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Family Law Cases as Law
Reform Litigation: Unrecognized Parents and the Story of Alison D. v. Virginia
M., 17 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 307 (2008).
83. 660 N.E.2d at 398.
84. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117(1)(a) (McKinney 2010) (“After the making of
an order of adoption the birth parents of the adoptive child shall be relieved of
all parental duties toward and of all responsibilities for and shall have no
rights over such adoptive child or to his property by descent or succession,
except as hereinafter stated.”).
85. In re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d at 403-04.
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rights of the biological parent.86 The case decided was the
consolidation of two cases, one of which involved an unmarried
heterosexual couple and the other involved a lesbian couple who
conceived a child through ART.87 In its holding, the court made
a statement that may portend the crux of many issues ahead
regarding same-sex parentage and marriage:
These concerns are particularly weighty in Matter
of Dana. Even if the Court were to rule against
him on this appeal, the male petitioner in Matter
of Jacob could still adopt by marrying Jacob‟s
mother. Dana, however, would be irrevocably
deprived of the benefits and entitlements of
having as her legal parents the two individuals
who have already assumed that role in her life,
simply as a consequence of her mother‟s sexual
orientation.88
Recently a surrogate court in New York has gone a step
further. In In re Adoption of Sebastian,89 the court heard a case
involving a lesbian couple who were legally married in the
Netherlands and who established a family through ART, where
one partner donated an egg, which was fertilized and implanted
in the ovary of the other who carried it to term.90 The court
recognized that, in such a situation, determining the legal
mother of the child is equivocal at best.91 New York has not
adopted the Uniform Parentage Act (2000),92 which does not
establish a test to determine legal motherhood but does imply
that the gestational mother is presumed to be the legal
mother.93 Instead the courts in New York, without statutory
guidance or Court of Appeals precedent, must rely on a range of
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. (applying N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117(1)(d)).
Id. at 398.
Id. at 405.
879 N.Y.S.2d 677 (Sur. Ct. 2009).
Id. at 678-79.
Id. at 687.
Id. at 690.
See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 201(a)(1) (amended 2002).
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persuasive decisions. The challenge is that those decisions are
not consistent. Courts have held that “in [an] „egg donation‟
case, the wife, who is the gestational mother, is the natural
mother of the children . . . .”94 Other courts, however, have
placed dispositive weight on the genetic relation between
mother and child and determined that the egg donor was, in
fact, the legal mother.95 In fact, the Sebastian court admitted
that the standard could be neither, but instead applied a caseby-case balancing of the two different standards.96
It is important to recognize that there are two issues that
underlie the court‟s consideration of this case. The first is a legal
schism between how the situation could or would be resolved if
the couple was heterosexual.97 The second is the failure of the
existing law, or even a binding judicial decision, to address the
rapid advancement of ART and the different ways in which it is
now used, particularly with respect to same-sex committed
partners.98 In addressing the first issue, the court made an
implied side-step and considered the two-mother issue a gender
classification,99 and it analyzed the law under a constitutional
“heightened scrutiny” standard.100
To its credit, the court could have easily focused narrowly
on only New York law and how it was applied in this particular
case. In New York, a child born into a marriage is legally
94. McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 480 (App. Div. 1994).
95. Arredondo v. Nodelman, 622 N.Y.S.2d 181, 182 (Sup. Ct. 1994).
96. In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d at 687 (referencing K.M. v.
E.G., 117 P.3d 673 (Cal. 2005), a California Supreme Court case, which held
that a child could have two parents (mothers)—one based on gestation and one
based on genetics).
97. Id. at 687-88.
98. Id. at 680.
99. This presumes that the issue can be only fully discussed when one
parent gives birth to the child. Homosexual men would be subject to the same
classification, but the analysis would be under a different set of constraints.
Both men would have to adopt the child since neither would be seen to have a
presumption of parenthood. Id. at 688-89. Interestingly, the classification fails
to consider the situation in which one member of a same-sex male couple
donates sperm to create an ovum with the intention of parenting the child.
Seen this way, it may be less clear whether this was a gender classification
rather than a sexual orientation classification, which most likely would not be
subject to intermediate scrutiny.
100. Id. at 689.
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presumed to be the child of the husband.101 Therefore, through
some minor interpretation of the language, a child born into a
valid same-sex marriage in New York would, absent a legal
action to the contrary, confer parental rights to the nongestational parent. Because, by executive order, New York
recognizes legal same-sex marriages entered into in other
jurisdictions,102 the parents of Sebastian—legally married in the
Netherlands103—would be considered legally married in New
York. Applying this analysis, the birth and non-birth mothers
would, in New York, be Sebastian‟s legal parents. The court
further identifies two other available options, somewhat less
radical than adoption, which the couple could employ to try to
establish parentage.104 The court could have stopped here;
second parent adoption would appear to be unnecessary.105 The
court, however, significantly points out that, because of the
disparate legal status of same-sex couples throughout the
United States, the only way to create a presumption of
parentage that would be protected by the Full Faith and Credit
Clause of the Constitution, and thus travel from state to state,
is by granting an adoption, ironically unnecessary in New
York.106
What the court does not mention, but is nonetheless
particularly significant, is the fact that recognition of the
couple‟s marriage in New York is due to an executive order, not
a statutory or constitutional provision. Governor Paterson‟s
successor, Governor Andrew Cuomo, stated during his campaign
that, “I don‟t want to be the governor who just proposes
marriage equality. . . . I want to be the governor who signs the

101. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 24(1) (McKinney 2010); see also N.Y. FAM.
CT. ACT § 516-a (McKinney 2009). It is, however, unclear how much of this
statute has been rendered unconstitutional as a result of the Sebastian
decision.
102. Dubin & Agnew, supra note 75, at 9.
103. In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d at 679.
104. The couple could apply for an amended birth certificate, see, e.g., Doe
v. N.Y. Bd. of Health, 782 N.Y.S.2d 180, 184 (Sup. Ct. 2004), or they could file
an acknowledgement of paternity. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4135-b (1)(a)
(McKinney 2010).
105. In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d at 692.
106. Id. at 692-93.
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law that makes equality a reality in the state of New York.”107
Given this sentiment, it is unlikely that he would be inclined to
rescind the executive order. However, the Democrat-controlled
state legislature failed to pass legislation allowing for same-sex
marriage prior to the election,108 and, with the Republican Party
taking control of the state senate,109 is doubtful than Governor
Cuomo will have any bill to sign in the foreseeable future.
Consequently, not only is same-sex marriage unlikely to become
allowed in New York, but recognition of foreign same-sex
marriage is tenuous; a court decision or ballot initiative away
from elimination.
C. Surrogacy
The second causal issue in the Adoption of Sebastian case is
the legal confusion that is created by the more extensive and
creative use of gestational surrogacy. There are two traditional
branches of surrogacy, which roughly correspond to two
motivational forces.110 Full surrogacy, which entails a woman
carrying her own ovum to term for the benefit of another
(woman or couple), has been looked at as a way to avoid
pregnancy and delivery.111 Because there is no conflict between
genetics and gestation, the mother is unarguably the legal
parent. Gestational surrogacy, where a woman carries a
genetically different ovum to term, has been traditionally

107. Celeste Katz, Cuomo Tells Gay Activists He Will Legalize Same-Sex
Marriage, Make ‘Equality a Reality' in New York, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Oct. 14,
2010, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/ny_local/2010/10/14/2010-1014_cuomo_tells_gay_
activists_he_will_legalize_samesex_marriage_make_equality_a_real.html.
108. Jeremy W. Peters, New York State Senate Votes Down Gay Marriage
Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2009, at A1.
109. Brendan Scott & Ginger Adams Otis, GOP Takes the State Senate,
N.Y. POST, Dec. 5, 2010, at 2.
110. For a fascinating historical and legal analysis of sperm and egg
donations, gestational and full surrogacy, and the economic and social
implications of the distinction between the two, see Noa Ben-Asher, The
Curing Law: On the Evolution of Baby-Making Markets, 30 CARDOZO L. REV.
1885 (2009).
111. Id. at 1887.
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viewed as a cure for infertility.112 Due to this perhaps erroneous
categorization, full surrogacy, particularly when there is a
financial component to the adoption arrangement, has been
viewed as “baby-selling.”113 Gestational surrogacy, on the other
hand, has been viewed as a medical response to infertility and,
accordingly, has seen less hostility from society and given more
deference from the courts.114
The New York legislature, however, responding perhaps to
the stigma of the concept of “baby-selling,” passed laws which
have repercussions beyond the limited confines of full surrogacy.
The DRL states that surrogate contracts are unenforceable
because they are contrary to the public policy of the state.115
While this might be viewed to be a prohibition against babyselling, the statute defines surrogate parenting contracts as
follows:
“Surrogate parenting contract” shall mean any
agreement, oral or written, in which:
(a) a woman agrees either to be inseminated with
the sperm of a man who is not her husband or to
be impregnated with an embryo that is the
product of an ovum fertilized with the sperm of a
man who is not her husband; and
(b) the woman agrees to, or intends to, surrender
or consent to the adoption of the child born as a
result of such insemination or impregnation.116
As such, under this law any agreement, even if just to allow for
the adoption of an ART child by a committed same-sex partner,
is unenforceable. The statute further provides that in any
dispute arising concerning the parental rights of the egg or
sperm donor, the gestational mother‟s right of parentage

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id. at 1906-12.
Id. at 1923-24.
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2010).
Id. § 121(4)(a)-(b).
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supersedes any surrogate parenting agreement.117
The implications of this may have broad repercussions.
Although the Sebastian court mentioned the lack of guidance
regarding motherhood when there is a conflict between
gestational and genetic “mothers,”118 it did not appear to
consider the ramifications of the DRL in conjunction with a
small, mostly overlooked, technical detail of the case. The court
alludes to the situation in which both genetics and gestation can
be determinants of parentage,119 but does not specifically apply
the DRL to address this question. What is telling, however, is
the fact that the court granted an adoption to the genetic
mother rather than to the gestational mother.120 What the court
is doing in this case, without necessarily intending to, is
affirming the interpretation of the DRL that says that, absent
any subsequent adoptive process, the gestational mother is the
legal mother regardless of the intention of the parties. While
this may make sense in New York, an argument could be made
that less than twenty five miles away in New Jersey the
decision would have been to allow an adoption by the
gestational mother if there were clear evidence that the
intention was for the genetic mother to raise the child.121
The problem would seem to be that, when written,
surrogacy laws did not contemplate the use of ART in a way
distinct from an infertility cure or baby-selling. As committed
same-sex couples, by necessity, employ ART to become co-

117. Id. § 124(1).
118. In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 681 (Sur. Ct. 2009)
(“At present there is no clear law in New York determining the relationship
between a child and various women who may lay claim to parentage through
genetic or gestational relationship.”).
119. Id. at 680. The court references, in particular, California which has
used intent as the critical test for determining the legal mother. Johnson v.
Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 1993) (“[W]e do not believe this case
can be decided without enquiring into the parties' intentions as manifested in
the surrogacy agreement.”). It is important to note, however, that Ohio, New
Jersey, and Tennessee have all followed the rule that if the genetic parents
were known and showed the intention, before the birth, to act as parents then
they are determined to be the legal parents. See Wald, supra note 36, at 39192.
120. In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d at 693.
121. See Wald, supra note 36, at 391-92.
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parents, courts are struggling to determine parentage without
clear legislative guidelines. This lack of clarity was best
expressed by an Ohio court:
The court finds that there are no statutory or
constitutional sections granting it authority to
render a declaratory-judgment action to
determine parentage and to issue an order
directing the hospital expecting to deliver the
unborn child to designate the genetic or biological
parents as the natural and legal parents of the
child. The court finds that it lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction to determine parentage of an unborn
child that is the subject of a surrogacy agreement
in a declaratory-judgment action. The legislature
should consider enacting legislation that
addresses the legal rights of children born under
surrogacy agreements.122
In essence, the Ohio judiciary is throwing up its hands and
telling the legislature that the laws, as enacted, do not offer
certainty as to parentage in gestational surrogacy situations
between committed same-sex partners. The Sebastian court
may have recognized, and, to an extent, addressed the essential
problem of establishing legal parentage which exists when the
validity of a couple‟s marital status changes when they move
from state to state. It did not, however, consider the more
fundamental question occurring when a child has a genetic and
a gestational mother, both of whom want to establish legal
parentage—who is the already existing legal mother? Although
it would appear straightforward to interpret the DRL as
establishing the gestational mother as the legal parent,123 this
seems at odds with the language in other decisions, which deny
the parental rights of parents who are neither biological nor

122. Nemcek v. Paskey, 849 N.E.2d 108, 111 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 2006). In its
decision, the court was rejecting an early decision which determined that
genetics was the strict determinant of parentage.
123. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 121-22, 124 (McKinney 2010).
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adoptive.124
IV. Repercussions of the Increasingly Incompatible Laws in
New York
By itself DOMA has created a situation that is becoming
increasingly untenable. Enacted under a Republican majority
Congress, DOMA was arguably the anti-gay-marriage act.125
Over the last fourteen years, the push to legitimize some form of
legally recognized relationship for same-sex couples126 has
created litigation which has focused on parsing the language of
the statute in such a way to avoid directly addressing the issue
of allowing states to deny what has often been seen as a
fundamental right.127
New York has not adopted its own DOMA,128 but neither
does it allow for same-sex marriage or civil unions. The New
York Court of Appeals has ruled that the legislature has the
constitutional power to pass a law permitting same-sex

124. See, e.g., Alison D. v. Virgina M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991)
(“[S]he is not the child‟s „parent‟; [sic] that is, she is not the biological mother
of the child nor is she a legal parent by virtue of an adoption.”); Behrens v.
Rimland, 822 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286 (App. Div. 2006) (“[T]he petitioner, who is
neither an adoptive nor a biological parent of Bryce, lacks standing to seek
visitation.”). In both these cases, and others with similar holdings, the court is
making the statement that acting in a parental role does not confer parental
rights. It is interesting, however, that when the gestational mother was also
the genetic mother, the court chose to frame the determining factor in terms of
biology not gestation.
125. Gabe Vick, The Defense of Marriage Act: The Crossroad of Love and
Legislation, 22 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW. 105, 106-07 (2009).
126. To date, thirteen states allow some form of same-sex marriage or
civil union. NAT‟L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 20.
127. E.g., Smelt v. Cnty. of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 683 n.26 (9th Cir. 2006)
(“Even if Smelt and Hammer were now in a California registered domestic
partnership, that is not by any means a marriage.”). It is hard, however, to
reconcile the idea that a domestic partnership is not “treated like a marriage,”
the operative phrase of the DOMA, when the California Family Code states
unequivocally “[r]egistered domestic partners shall have the same rights,
protections, and benefits, and shall be subject to the same responsibilities,
obligations, and duties under law, . . . as are granted to and imposed upon
spouses.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(d) (West 2009).
128. NAT‟L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 20.
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marriage.129 Lower courts have used the reasoning in
Hernandez to recognize same-sex marriages from other
jurisdictions,130 and former-Governor Paterson issued an
executive order that affords rights and protection to same-sex
couples legally married in other states or countries.131 Despite
these policy trends, there is no definitive law regarding samesex couples in New York. For example, civil unions from other
states have not been regarded with full faith and credit in New
York. In Langan v. State Farm Fire & Casualty,132 a New York
appellate division court held that the state Workers
Compensation Board was not required to grant death benefits to
the surviving partner of a Vermont legal civil union.133
The repercussions of this judicial ambiguity may logically
lead to inconsistency that would be difficult to reconcile. For
example, consider three hypothetical same-sex couples: one
legally married and living in Massachusetts, one living with a
registered domestic partnership in California, and one having
lived their whole lives in New York. If all three couples end up
living in the same apartment building in Manhattan there may
be three very different circumstances all existing at the same
address.
The couple from Massachusetts, by virtue of their valid outof-state marriage, would be presumed married under the
executive order of Governor Paterson and a number of
persuasive lower court decisions. That presumption would
vanish in an instant, however, if Governor Cuomo, despite his
statements to the contrary, rescinded the order, if the
legislature adopted the DOMA, or if the Court of Appeals held
that, absent a constitutional or statutory mandate, there was no
imperative to recognize an out-of-state marriage.
129. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 5 (N.Y. 2006).
130. E.g., Lewis v. N.Y. State Dep‟t of Civil Serv., 872 N.Y.S.2d 578 (App.
Div. 2009) (recognizing out-of-state marriage for the purpose of obtaining
spousal health benefits); C.M v. C.C., 867 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Sup. Ct. 2008)
(highlighting the unique situation that although a same-sex couple may not be
married in New York, New York will recognize a same-sex marriage from
another state and grant a divorce).
131. Dubin & Agnew, supra note 75, at 9.
132. 849 N.Y.S.2d 105 (App. Div. 2007).
133. Id. at 78-79.
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The couple from California would likely not be granted legal
status with respect to one another. In California, domestic
partnerships confer the same legal rights as marriage,134 but in
New York there is no recognition of this legal relationship. For
example, if one of the two was employed by the state and was
eligible for family health benefits, it seems the state could deny
those benefits to the domestic partner.135
The New York couple knows where they stand. As a result
of their continuous residence in New York, they would have the
most unambiguous lack of rights. Regardless of the couple‟s
intentions or length of relationship, there is currently no way,
short of traveling to one of the five states that allow for samesex marriage and getting married there, for the couple to create
any sort of legal relationship in New York.
It could be argued that the Governor and the judicial
branch are attempting to rectify a situation that the legislature
has refused to clarify. In failing to adopt DOMA and, as recently
as December of 2009, failing to pass a bill allowing for same-sex
marriage,136 the legislature has left the executive and courts to
apply solutions that are neither enduring nor comprehensive. In
addition, although New York recognizes marriages from other
jurisdictions, it does not recognize civil unions or domestic
partnerships, and the courts have not been inclined to extend
this recognition.137
Without legislative guidance, the judiciary faces an even
more daunting task. Many of the questions raised regarding
same-sex relationships have to be addressed in the context of
quickly changing laws. For example, in December of 2006 before
Governor Paterson‟s executive order in Gonzalez v. Green,138 a
supreme court ruled on a gay couple‟s petition for divorce. The
court held that the couple‟s Massachusetts marriage was valid

134. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(d) (West 2010).
135. Langan, 849 N.Y.S.2d at 107-08.
136. Peters, supra note 108, at A1.
137. E.g., Langan, 849 N.Y.S.2d at 108 (“Although we may recognize the
civil union status of claimant and decedent as a matter of comity, we are not
thereby bound to confer upon them all of the legal incidents of that status
recognized in the foreign jurisdiction that created the relationship.”).
138. 831 N.Y.S.2d 856 (Sup. Ct. 2006).
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in neither New York nor Massachusetts.139 The Massachusetts
law defining marriage stated that “[n]o marriage shall be
contracted in this commonwealth by a party residing and
intending to continue to reside in another jurisdiction if such
marriage would be void if contracted in such other jurisdiction,
and every marriage contracted in this commonwealth in
violation hereof shall be null and void.”140 They reasoned that,
since same-sex marriage was not legal in New York at the time
of the marriage, the Massachusetts‟ marriage was null and
void.141
Twenty months later, in the C.M. v C.C.,142 the court was
faced with two new legal developments: first, Governor
Paterson‟s executive order and second, the repeal of the
Massachusetts statute referred to in Gonzalez.143 Given these
changes, any couple now married in Massachusetts would have
that union legally recognized in New York. The court,
specifically acknowledging these developments, found a way to
recognize the Massachusetts marriage, ironically for the
purpose of granting a divorce.144 The cases are strikingly
similar, and, notwithstanding the executive order, either court
could have used the other‟s reasoning. The difference in the
outcome of the two cases, it would seem, would have more to do
with the rapid changes in the related law, rather than any
change in the specific controlling law.145
If the situation created by DOMA and by legislative
inaction in New York regarding same-sex marriage is
inconsistent, then those circumstances become almost untenable

139. Id. at 858-59.
140. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 11 (West 2010) (repealed 2008).
141. Gonzalez, 831 N.Y.S.2d at 859.
142. 867 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Sup. Ct. 2008).
143. Id. at 887-88.
144. In a rather parsed analysis, the court decided that since the couple
was married prior to the Hernandez decision in 2006, which banned same-sex
marriage in New York, the marriage was at that time not (yet) prohibited in
New York. Therefore, the (now repealed) Massachusetts statute did not nullify
their marriage. Id. at 888-89.
145. Both couples were married in 2005, before the Hernandez decision
and the repeal of MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 207, § 11. C.M., 867 N.Y.S.2d at
885; Gonzalez, 867 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
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when parentage and ART technological advances are added to
the mix. If one partner of each of the three hypothetical couples
living in the same hypothetical building were to become
pregnant and give birth, increasingly unpredictable and
incompatible results begin to emerge.
Technically, the couple from Massachusetts, again through
the executive order of the Governor, as a married couple would
be presumptively the legal parents of the child. The Sebastian
court, however, noted that the presumption of parentage would
not necessarily travel out of state, that is, would not necessarily
be given full faith and credit by other states.146 The Sebastian
court chose to address this issue and allow the non-gestational
mother to seek a second parent adoption, which would be
recognized in a foreign state.147 The court acknowledges,
however, that this solution has two inherent problems: first,
granting an adoption to a married couple is, at best, redundant,
and at worst impermissible;148 second, there is the hint of
gender discrimination in requiring the second parent adoption
for a married lesbian couple.149 The court asks, “why shouldn‟t
the lesbian genetic mother of a child born to her partner be
permitted to utilize either of the existing statutory paternity
procedures to establish her parentage status and rights, rather
than being limited to the more expensive, time consuming and
intrusive adoption mechanism?”150 There is nothing to indicate
that the Sebastian (surrogate‟s) court‟s opinion would be
persuasive in any other court if the Massachusetts couple
petitioned for a second parent adoption.
The couple from California would have an easier time
completing a second parent adoption, but may find themselves
frustrated and confused by the requirement to do so. In
California, domestic partnerships confer the same legal
parentage rights as marriage,151 and, if born in California, it is

146.
2009).
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

In re Adoption of Sebastian, 879 N.Y.S.2d 677, 691-93 (Sur. Ct.
Id. at 691.
See id. at 683-85.
See id. at 683-88.
Id. at 688.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(d) (West 2009).
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likely that the child‟s birth certificate would have automatically
listed both mothers. In this case, being born in New York may
benefit the child since it is not at all certain, short of an
adoption agreement, what weight an out-of-state birth
certificate or paternity acknowledgement would be given. For
example, if the non-gestational employee were eligible for family
health benefits, it seems the state could deny those benefits to
the domestic partner,152 but how would benefit eligibility for a
child of domestic partnership be determined?
The New York couple has the same restricted option
available. Second parent adoption is the only way that the nongestational mother could obtain any parental rights. As courts
have consistently held, the intention and relationship (other
than marriage) do not confer any meaningful parental rights.153
To take the hypothetical situation a step further, the law
becomes even more unreliable if the pregnancy resulted from an
ART procedure that impregnated the gestational mother with
the genetic ovum of the other partner. At this point, all three
couples face the same murky situation. In applying for a second
parent adoption to protect the rights of the non-parent, it is not
at all certain who the presumptive parent is. Certainly, under
New York‟s DRL, if any sort of surrogacy contract is made, it is
void and the gestational mother is the presumptive parent.154
Courts in New York, however, have not been consistent in
declaring presumptive parent status to the gestational mother.
In Perry-Rogers v. Fasano,155 the court had to consider the
situation in which an embryo was implanted in the uterus of the
wrong woman. When the gestational mother sought visitation
with the child she bore, but to whom she was not genetically
related, the court determined that her gestational status did not
give her standing to seek visitation.156 The language the court
used, in fact, implies that perhaps the presumption of

152. See Langan v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 849 N.Y.S.2d 105, 107-08
(App. Div. 2007).
153. See, e.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991);
Behrens v. Rimland, 822 N.Y.S.2d 285, 286 (App. Div. 2006).
154. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 124(1) (McKinney 2010).
155. 715 N.Y.S.2d 19 (App. Div. 2000).
156. Id. at 74.
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parenthood lies with the genetic mother.157 The intent analysis
applied in California,158 which looks not only at gestation and
genetics, but what the parties actually intended, has also been
applied in New York.159
Although one might argue that, in the case of two
committed individuals jointly asking to have both mothers
declared as parents, a court would likely choose not to focus on
the issue of who needs to apply but rather default to recognizing
the gestational mother as the parent, as did the Sebastian court.
However, there are plausible scenarios in which the identity of
the presumptive parent would be at issue. For example, what if
the New York couple sees their relationship fracture during the
pregnancy and chooses to separate? The baby carried in the
womb of one woman is a genetic stranger to her. The nongestational woman is the unborn child‟s biological mother. If
there ensued a contentious custody battle for the unborn, or just
born, child, where would the court look for guidance? A
compelling case could be made for considering genetics,
gestation, or intention to determine parentage.
A similar quandary might occur if the California couple in
the hypothetical apartment building, prior to completing a
second parent adoption, is tragically killed in a car accident.
Imagine they both died intestate, and each set of grandparents
bring suit seeking sole custody of the child. Again, each side
would be able to make a persuasive legal argument supporting
its claim.160

157. Id. at 73 (“It is apparent . . . that a „gestational mother‟ may possess
enforceable rights under the law, despite her being a „genetic stranger‟ to the
child. Given the complex possibilities in these kind of circumstances, it is
simply inappropriate to render any determination solely as a consequence of
genetics.”).
158. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 783 (Cal. 1993) (“[W]e have felt
free to take into account the parties‟ intentions, as expressed in the surrogacy
contract, because in our view the agreement is not, on its face, inconsistent
with public policy.”).
159. See McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477 (App. Div. 1994).
160. The parents of the gestational mother would rely on N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW §§ 121-22, 124 (McKinney 2010), while the genetic grandparents would
argue that decisions holding that biology is a determinate factor in visitation
or custody would adhere. See, e.g., In re Jordan, 875 N.Y.S.2d 188 (App. Div.
2009) (“[B]iological or legal strangers to a child have no standing to pursue
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Perhaps the most convoluted, yet eminently conceivable,
situation might occur if the couple from Massachusetts, rather
than employing an anonymous sperm donor, chose to use the
sperm of a friend, a gay man domiciled in New York and
married legally in Connecticut. The two couples decide that they
intend to raise the child with two mothers and two fathers. In
fact, when the baby is born they list the gestational mother and
sperm-donor father on the birth certificate. How would a court
analyze the parentage of the child? Because each couple‟s
marriage is recognized under former-Governor Paterson‟s
executive order, and because there is a presumption that the
married partner is the parent of the child of the spouse, it would
seem that there are four individuals who could legitimately
assert parental rights.
V. Conclusion
The questions raised by the laws and judicial decisions that
apply, which often at times contradict each other, have no
simple answers. Even legislative action clarifying a position on
same-sex marriage, while a step in the right direction, would
not be enough. It is hard to divine the motivations of couples
like the Cora‟s who chose a somewhat complicated application of
ART, but it cannot be discounted that this may very well be a
way of attempting to undercut the disparate treatment of
homosexuals from state to state due to the DOMA. By creating
situations that cannot be simply and consistently adjudicated by
lower courts, same-sex couples place a growing pressure on
appellate courts, and ultimately the Supreme Court, to reconcile
DOMA and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and, perhaps in
the long run, hold that sexual orientation is a semi-suspect
classification. Until that time, New York will continue to
struggle to shore up a crumbling and ill-fated framework.

visitation.”).
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